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Abstract—Many basic key distribution schemes specifically
tuned to wireless sensor networks have been proposed in the
literature. Recently, several researchers have proposed schemes
in which they have used group-based deployment models and
assumed predeployment knowledge of the expected locations
of nodes. They have shown that these schemes achieve better
performance than the basic schemes, in terms of connectivity,
resilience against node capture and storage requirements. But in
many situations expected locations of nodes are not available. In
this paper we propose a solution which uses the basic scheme, but
does not use group-based deployment model and predeployment
knowledge of the locations of nodes, and yet performs better than
schemes which make the aforementioned assumptions.
In our scheme, groups are formed after deployment of sensor
nodes, on the basis of their physical locations, and the nodes
sample keys from disjoint key pools. Compromise of a node
affects secure links with other nodes that are part of its group
only. Because of this reason, our scheme performs better than the
basic schemes and the schemes using predeployment knowledge,
in terms of connectivity, storage requirement, and security.
Moreover, the post-deployment key generation process completes
sooner than in schemes like LEAP+ [10].
Keywords-Security; Key Distribution; Sensor Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to advances in technology, it is now possible to have
low-cost, stand-alone sensor and actuator devices that can
communicate through the wireless medium. Such devices
have applications in areas like epidemic detection, biological
attack detection, intruder detection. In some applications,
these sensor nodes are deployed in hostile environments, and
therefore security of communication becomes critical. To pro-
vide security, well-developed public key cryptographic meth-
ods have been considered, but these are compute-intensive
and too demanding for resource-constrained devices [4]. So,
symmetric key based encryption is the only way for secure
communication between nodes. However, to do that, two nodes
should agree upon a common key first. For this, various key
distribution schemes have been proposed in the literature. Es-
chenauer and Gligor [6] proposed a random key predistribution
scheme, referred to as the basic scheme or EG scheme. Based
on this scheme, various improvements have been proposed in
the literature [2], [3], [9], [11], [12].
Recently, there has been research on key distribution
schemes which make use of predeployment knowledge of
expected locations of the nodes, and these schemes are shown
to perform better than the basic schemes. But in some cases
predeployment knowledge is not available, so in [5] Liu et.al.
proposed a scheme which uses group-based deployment model
and showed that their scheme is better than the basic schemes.
Although in [1], Anjum proposed a scheme which does not
use predeployment knowledge of the nodes, and group-based
deployment model, the scheme requires some nodes which can
transmit at different power levels.
Our scheme also uses the same concept of groups as
used by [1], [5], [13] but we have dropped the assumptions
of predeployment knowledge of expected locations of nodes
and group-based deployment. Moreover, our scheme does not
require nodes which can transmit messages at different power
levels.
Our contributions in this paper are as follows.
• We propose a scheme, in which nodes form groups after
deployment on the basis of their physical locations, and
generate keys which depend on the group they are part
of. Each group is assigned a key pool and no two key
pools have a common key. If a node is compromised,
then it can affect communication in its group only; so
the proposed scheme is more resilient to node capture
than the basic schemes.
• We show using simulations that our scheme performs
better than the basic scheme [6] and the schemes which
assume pre-deployment knowledge of node locations
[13]. Our scheme assumes that there exists some constant
time before which the adversary is unable to extract keys
from the nodes, as assumed in [1], [10]. We show that
this time can be considerably less for our scheme than
that in [10], with certain tradeoff.
• We also look at the problem of connectivity of the key
graph formed when our scheme is followed. This problem
is studied in the framework of the “AB random geometric
graph” [16]. Using results in [16], the number of tagged
nodes is calculated such that the whole key graph is
connected with high probability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we discuss related work. Section III describes our proposal.
Section IV gives the expressions for the parameters ensuring
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connectivity of the key graph. Section V gives the compar-
ison with the scheme proposed by Du.et.al [13]. Section VI
describes other applications where our scheme could be useful.
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Various key distribution schemes have been proposed in
the literature for wireless sensor networks, keeping in view
the resource-constrained devices used in these networks. Es-
chenauer and Gligor [6] proposed a scheme in which for every
node, keys are picked randomly (with replacement) from a
key pool and assigned to it before deployment; this scheme is
known as the basic or EG scheme. After key discovery, two
neighbor nodes that have a common key use that as the key
for secure communication. Based on this basic scheme, several
schemes with enhanced security features have been suggested
in [1], [3], [7], [12], [13].
There is another class of schemes called “threshold
schemes.” In these schemes, all nodes can communicate with
one another, and no communication is compromised until
some fixed number of nodes is compromised. Blundo et.al.
[3] and Blom [2] proposed such threshold schemes. Blundo’s
scheme uses symmetric bivariate polynomials to obtain pair-
wise keys, while Blom’s scheme also uses a similar idea,
in which symmetric matrices are used instead of symmetric
polynomials.
Du et. al. [12] improve upon Blom’s scheme by combining it
with the random key distribution scheme. Similarly, Liu and
Ning [9] improve upon Blundo’s [3] scheme by combining
it with random key distribution scheme. Both these schemes
perform better than the EG scheme [6] in terms of connectivity
and resilience against node capture. But threshold schemes do
not scale with the number of nodes in the network. For a
fixed resilience against node capture, if the number of nodes
is increased, then they require large memory.
In any sensor network, generally nodes need to talk to their
neighbor nodes only. So it is quite intuitive that nodes which
are near should share the same key pool. This will lead to
more efficient use of memory, and will give better connectivity
and better resilience against node capture. Because of this
reason, various location-based key distribution schemes have
been proposed.
Du et.al. [13] and Liu and Ning [8] independently proposed
schemes which assume predeployment knowledge of expected
locations of the nodes. Nodes are assumed to be deployed
in groups (group-based deployment model) and nodes in the
same group have the same expected location, so that after
deployment, they lie close to one another. Further in [13],
nodes in the same group are allocated keys from the same
key pool, while the groups which lie far from each other are
allocated disjoint key pools. Therefore, compromise of any
node jeopardises transmissions of nearby nodes only. Due to
this reason, performance is better than that of the EG scheme.
All the location-based schemes which depend on the knowl-
edge of expected locations of nodes perform well, but they are
all prone to estimation errors in the expected positions of the
nodes. So other schemes which do not assume predeployment
knowledge of the expected locations of the nodes have been
proposed.
In [5], Liu et.al. proposed a scheme which does not use
expected locations of the nodes but still uses group-based
deployment. This scheme proposes a framework, and any
basic scheme like random key distribution or polynomial-
based scheme can be used with this framework. The authors
showed that basic schemes used with their proposed frame-
work perform better than when used alone.
Further, Anjum [1] removed the assumption of group-
based deployment model and also removed the assumption
of knowledge of expected locations of nodes. He showed that
the scheme performs better than the basic scheme; but the
scheme requires nodes which can transmit at different power
levels. In this scheme there are some special nodes which
generate different random numbers (nonces) and transmit them
at different power levels. Nodes receiving the same nonce
can communicate, provided they are neighbors. Our scheme
is different from this scheme, since we do not require the
presence of nodes which can transmit at different levels.
Instead of using different power levels, our scheme uses TTL
scoping. In TTL scoping, after the deployment phase, some
nodes transmit a broadcast packet containing the TTL (Time
to Live) field, similar to that of IP packets in data networks.
In addition, our scheme is also different in the way nodes
choose their key rings. In [1], on receiving the nonce, nodes
map it to some different value. In contrast, in our scheme,
some nodes transmit their id, and corresponding to every id
there is an associated key pool. Nodes sample keys from the
key pool corresponding to the received id. The main advantage
of doing this is the improved resilience against node capture.
In [1], all nodes receiving the same nonce use the same key
for secure communication; so if any node is compromised,
all the secure links formed by the nonce received by this
node will be compromised. On the other hand, in our scheme,
communication with other nodes is compromised with some
probability only, because nodes receiving the same id sample
keys from the key pool instead of using the same key.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME FOR KEY GENERATION AND
DISCOVERY
In this paper, we consider static sensor networks. Nodes
are uniformly distributed across the deployment region. We
use the following cryptographic primitives:
• Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG) — This is
a deterministic function, which takes an n bit number as
input and produces output of m > n pseudorandom bits:
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m (1)
• Hash function — This is a deterministic function which
takes an input of any length and returns a number of
fixed bit-size. Given the output of the hash function, one
cannot find the input and it is highly unlikely that for two
different inputs, the output is same:
h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}c (2)
where n is variable, and c is fixed.
A. Description of our scheme
In our scheme, all nodes are divided into two sets: the
“tagged node” set and the “normal node” set. Tagged nodes
are similar to normal nodes in terms of memory, storage,
and transmission range. They are deployed in the same way
as normal nodes. The difference is that tagged nodes are
programmed to broadcast a packet after the deployment phase
is over. Subsequently, tagged nodes behave like normal nodes.
Once deployment is over, a tagged node broadcasts a packet
with TTL value H . Nodes within distance Hr from the
tagged node receive this packet, and all these nodes associate
themselves in one group. Different groups are associated with
disjoint key pools, and nodes in a group “sample” keys
from the same key pool. Since we are using disjoint key
pools, so compromise of any node results in compromise of
communications in its group only; in this way localization of
the effects of node compromise is achieved.
Our scheme relies on the assumption that the adversary will
not be able to extract keying material from a captured node
before a small time interval has elapsed. This is a reasonable
assumption because breaking into a node and extracting keying
material will take some time. The same assumption has been
made in [10] and [1].
Our scheme consists of the following four phases:
• Predeployment Phase
• Broadcast Phase
• Key Generation Phase
• Shared Key Discovery Phase
1) Predeployment Phase: In this phase, two keys are stored
in the nodes.
• Global key (Kg): This is common to all the nodes and is
used for authentication and encryption of packets during
the broadcast phase.
• Root Key (Kr): This key is a single key stored in all
the nodes. It is used to derive the other keys during
the key allocation phase; this procedure is explained
subsequently.
2) Broadcast Phase: After nodes are deployed, all tagged
nodes broadcast a packet up to H hops, containing two
fields: Tagged node id field and Hop count field. Each node
(both normal and tagged node) receiving this packet fetches
the tagged node id from the packet, and compares it with
previously stored tag ids. If there is no match with any of the
previously stored tag ids, then its value is stored. Then, the
hop count value is fetched from the packet and its value is
decreased by 1. If, after decreasing, the value is 0, then the
packet is discarded; otherwise, the packet is broadcast again
with the new value of the hop count. This broadcast packet
is encrypted and authenticated using the global key (Kg). All
nodes are able to decrypt and authenticate this packet since
this key is stored in all the nodes. After the end of this phase,
all nodes which are within distance Hr from the tagged node
receive the packet. In this way, all the nodes are divided into
groups, on the basis of their physical locations.
Consider a tagged node j. It will broadcast a packet with
tagged node id field set to j. All nodes within the radius
of Hr of this tagged node will receive this packet and
associate themselves with tagged node id j. All these nodes
will consider themselves as a part of group Gj . So there will
be a group corresponding to each tagged node. We note that,
since a node can receive broadcasts from more than one tagged
node, a node can be part of multiple groups.
There is a key pool corresponding to each group and each
node samples k keys from the key pool of each group to which
it belongs. Since a node can be part of multiple groups, so
different nodes can choose different key ring sizes. To bound
the number of keys chosen by any node, a limit is put on the
number of key pools from which a node samples keys. Let
Tkey be the maximum number of groups to which a node can
belong.
We define two sets for any node u, Bu and Tu. Bu contains
all the distinct tagged node ids received during the broadcast
phase. Tu is a subset of Bu. A selects Tkey tag ids out of the
received tag ids, and the set Tu contains these selected values.
Randomly selecting the tagged node ids from Bu is not
the best thing to do. Consider an example with Tkey = 1. If
two neighbor nodes receive broadcasts from the same 4 nodes,
then on randomly selecting the tag id, the probability that both
choose the same tagged node id is 1/4. But if both the nodes
plan to choose the least tag node id, then with probability 1
they will choose the same tag node id. And intuitively one
can say that two neighbor nodes are more likely to receive
broadcasts from the same set of tagged nodes. So we set the
selection criterion as: Node u selects the smallest Tkey tagged
node ids from the set Bu.
3) Key Generation Phase: Once the broadcast phase is
over, nodes select Tkey smallest tag ids from the received tag
ids. If we consider node u, then it is a part of groups in the
set Gu = {Gj , ∀j ∈ Tu}. After the node has associated itself
with the groups, it has to sample keys from the key pools
corresponding to the selected groups. One way to do this is
to store all the key pools in all the nodes before deployment,
but this is not feasible because of memory constraints. So we
propose a way in which nodes can compute the keys such
that it is equivalent to first selecting the key pools and then
sampling keys from them.
Let Pj be the key pool associated with tag id j or group id
j. The pool is generated by using 3.
Pj = {h(KGj ||i), 1 ≤ i ≤M} (3a)
KGj = h
j(Kr) (3b)
Here, (||) represents the concatenation operator, M is the
key pool size per group, Kr is the root key as defined earlier
and hj(Kr) represents j hash operations on Kr; for example
h2(Kr) = h(h(Kr)).
However, instead of deriving the key pool and then sampling
the keys, one can first select k numbers uniformly distributed
in the range from 1 to M , (called Key Indices), and then
applying the function h(KGj ||i) to them. Each key can be
identified by the tuple (Group Number, Key Index). Keys
are stored along with this tuple to identify them during the
subsequent key discovery phase.
To understand the procedure followed by nodes to derive
their key rings, we consider a node u, and examine what it
does.
1) Node u generates the set Ku = {KGj , ∀j ∈ Tu},
and arranges it in ascending order of its index values,
{KGj1 ,KGj2 , ...}, with j2 > j1. Let us call these values
“Group Keys.” If there are large number of tagged nodes then
it will be expensive to compute the group key corresponding to
tag nodes with large tag id’s. So to minimize the computation,
some fraction of group keys, uniformly distributed across the
full range, can be computed offline and stored in the node
before deployment. For example, if the number of tagged node
is 1800, then 36 group keys (KGj50 ,KGj100 ..) could be pre-
stored, so that the average number of hash computations done
by any node will be 25.
2) In this step, node u generates |Tu| sets each containing
k values in the range of 1 to M . These sets are generated
using the PRNG, with Tkeyu+1, Tkeyu+2...Tkeyu+ |Tu| as
the seed values. Let us call the elements of these sets “Key
Indices.” Since a node can generate a maximum of Tkey sets,
so it will use Tkey seed values in the range Tkeyu + 1 to
Tkey(u + 1). Further, nodes u and u + 1 will use different
seed values since node u will use seed values in the range
Tkeyu+1 to Tkey(u+1), while node u+1 will use values in
the range Tkey(u+1)+1 to Tkey(u+2). In this way, all sets
of key indices are generated independently, and hence the key
rings are also generated independently.
3) In this step, mapping of Key Indices to actual keys is
done. Node u has |Tu| Group Keys and same number of Key
Index sets. Node u will pair each Key Index set with a single
Group Key. Pairs are formed by first arranging the group
keys in ascending order of their indices, and the Group Key
with the smallest index is paired up with the Key Index set
generated using Tkeyu+ 1 as the seed value. From each pair,
k tuples are formed, where the first element of the tuple is
the Group Key and the second element is the Key Index of
the set. For example, suppose Tu = {2, 5}. If the Key Index
Set produced using Tkeyu + 1 is {1, 9, 10} and that using
Tkeyu + 2 is {11, 91, 56}, then following set of tuples is
produced:
Ktup = {(KG2 , 1), (KG2 , 9), (KG2 , 10), (KG5 , 11),
(KG5 , 91), (KG5 , 56)}
Note that each tuple can be identified by (Group Number(j),
Key Index). So even after the key KGj is deleted from the
memory of the node, tuples can be identified using the group
number; for the above example, tuples can be identified by
{(2, 1), (2, 9), (2, 10), (5, 11), (5, 91), (2, 56)}. This is impor-
tant because during the key discovery phase, node will send
it’s node id (u) and the set Tu, and from this information,
other nodes should be able to identify the common keys.
Final keys are obtained by concatenating the elements of
the tuple and then hashing the resultant value. This procedure
is also illustrated in Fig. 1.
Our scheme requires nodes that are close to each other to
be in the same group, nodes in the same group to sample keys
from the same key pool and key pools selected by distinct
groups to be disjoint. The procedure described above satisfies
all our requirements.
As soon as the key allocation phase is over, Kr and the
set Ku should be deleted from memory, because given this
information, an attacker may be able to generate all the keys
in the network, and that will lead to compromise of all
communication.
PRNG ...
...
+
Hashing h(.)
Tkeyu+ 1
k values
KGl
Key Ring of node u for group Gl
(k tuples)
(k keys)
(l is the least Group No. received by node u)
Fig. 1: Key Ring generation of node u
4) Shared key discovery phase: In this phase, node u
broadcasts its node id and the set Tu. If node v is a neighbor of
node u, then node v will receive the broadcast by node u. On
receiving this broadcast packet, node v will fetch the set Tu
and then compare its elements with Tv. If there is no matching
element between the two sets, then there is no common key.
If there are common elements between the two sets, then call
the set of matching elements as Tuv , Tuv = Tu ∩ Tv. Let us
call an element of Tuv as tuv . Now node v will find the index
of the elements present in the set Tuv, in sets Tu and Tv. What
is done with the index is explained using the example below.
For example, let Tu = {1, 5, 9, 13} and Tv = {1, 4, 13, 15},
so the set Tuv = {1, 13}, and the index of these elements in
set Tu is 1 and 4, while in set Tv it is 1 and 3.
Now node v will generate k numbers for seed values
Tkeyu + 1, Tkeyu + 4 and Tkeyv + 1, Tkeyv + 3 using the
PRNG. Then it will compare the values produced from seed
values Tkeyu+1 and Tkeyv+1, and also compare the values
produced from the seed values Tkeyu+ 4 and Tkeyv + 3.
If any value matches, then the node u and v share a common
key, and as mentioned earlier, the key is identified by the tuple
(Group Number, Key Index). If multiple keys are found to be
shared, then XOR of all the keys will be used as the common
key. On following a similar procedure, node u can also find
common keys with node v.
IV. DESIGN PARAMETERS ENSURING CONNECTIVITY
After keys have been generated and discovered, the natural
question which arises is: Can any two nodes exchange infor-
mation securely? This question is addressed by considering
the notion of the key graph and connectivity of the key graph.
A node is represented by a vertex in the graph. There exists
an edge between two vertices if the corresponding nodes share
at least one common key, and lie in the coverage radius of each
other. A graph formed in this way is called a “key graph.”
There are two properties of connectivity: local connectivity
and global connectivity. Local connectivity of any node is the
probability of sharing at least one key with the neighbor nodes,
while global connectivity is the percentage of the nodes in the
key graph that is reachable from any node.
In this section, we are concerned with the problem of how
to find the number of tagged and normal nodes such that the
resulting key graph is connected. The problem of connectivity
of the key graph can be broken down into followingthe three
sub problems:
• IntEr Group connectivity (IEG) — Since key pools are
disjoint, so nodes belonging to two different groups will
have zero probability of sharing a key. So, two groups
can only be connected if there exist l nodes (l ≥ 1),
which belong to both the groups. As these common nodes
sample keys from the key pools of both the groups, so
these nodes are reachable from the nodes of both the
groups; thus, these nodes act as “gateways.”
Now consider a graph in which a group is represented by
a vertex, and there exists an edge between two vertices,
if there exists at least one common node between two
groups. In this graph, if all the vertices are reachable
from any vertex, then the IEG property holds. We will
use the results in [16] on AB random geometric graphs
to find the minimum number of groups or tagged nodes
required such that all the groups are connected.
In [16], two kinds of nodes are considered: A type and B
type. Two A type nodes can communicate via a B type
node only. Let the graph formed in this way among A
type nodes, be denoted as G(n, cn, rn), where n is the
number of A type nodes and cn is the number of B type
nodes. We apply this framework by taking type A nodes
as tagged nodes, and type B nodes as normal nodes.
Define Mn as the largest nearest neighbor radius of the
AB random geometric graph, i.e., the radius below which
there exists at least one node with degree equal to zero.
Then, [16] shows that limn→∞ P (Mn ≤ rn) = e−β for
transmission radius (rn) equal to
√
log(n/β)
cnpi .
Also, the thereshold transmission radius of the nodes
for which the graph G(n, cn, rn) is connected with high
probability as n→∞ is given by Eqn. 4:
rn =
(
2 +
√
c
2
)(
log(n/β)
cnpi
).5
(4)
We will fix β, which will translate to a target small
probability of “graph isolated” groups. Then, we find the
value of number of tagged nodes (n) required, for the
given value of rn = Hr and total number of nodes to be
deployed (N = n(1 + c)), by substituting rn = Hr and
c = N−nn in Eqn. 4. If n
∗ is the solution obtained and if
Ti = ⌈n∗⌉, then the number of tagged nodes greater than
Ti will satisfy IEG property.
• Tagged node-covered — Nodes which do not receive
broadcasts will not be part of any group; so these nodes
are isolated from rest of the network. The number of
tagged nodes should be such that all the normal nodes
are covered by broadcast from at least one tagged node.
We will use the result from [15] to calculate the expected
number of normal nodes not covered by any broadcast.
It is given by Eqn. 5.
E[Nt] = (N − n)e− nApi(Hr)
2 (5)
where, A is the deployment area. To satisfy this property,
E[Nt] should be less than 1. If n∗ is the solution of the
equation E[Nt] = 1, and if Tc = ⌈n∗⌉, then the number
of tagged nodes greater than Tc will satisfy node-covered
property.
So, to satisfy both the node-covered property and and
inter group connectivity, the number of tagged nodes is
given by Eqn. 6.
T > max(Tc, Ti) (6)
• IntrA Group connectivity (IAG) — All the nodes within
a group should be reachable from any node in the
key graph. We will ensure this by using expressions to
calculate the keyring size in the EG scheme [6]. Since
the number of nodes in a group has decreased, so less
number of nodes will share the key pool. So, key pool
size could be reduced, which, in turn, will reduce the
requisite keyring size.
If all the above mentioned requirements are met, then our
objective of connectivity of the key graph is achieved, because
all the nodes are reachable within a group, all the groups are
reachable from any group and all the nodes are part of at least
one group.
V. EVALUATION & COMPARISON
We compare our proposed scheme with the scheme [13]
which makes the stronger assumption of availability of ex-
pected knowledge of positions of nodes, which our scheme
does not. However our scheme makes another assumption: that
there exists an interval (vulnerable time), after the deployment,
during which attacker should not be able to extract the keys.
It may be noted that in our scheme, keys are generated by
nodes after they are deployed, while in [13], keys are loaded
into nodes before deployment. Moreover, our scheme also has
the features of random key distribution. So it is appropriate to
compare the connectivity and resilience of our scheme with
that of schemes which use random key pre distribution (RKD)
schemes (for example, [6]) and a scheme like in [13], which
uses RKD with the assumption of knowledge of expected
locations of the nodes. We will also compare our scheme
with LEAP+ in [10], which is also a post-deployment key
generation scheme and considers the notion of vulnerable time.
We will argue that our scheme leads to a smaller vulnerable
time than that required by in LEAP+, and discuss a related
trade-off.
For the evaluation of our scheme, we use the following
metrics.
• Connectivity of the nodes in the key graph: local and
global connectivity.
• Resilience against node capture — This is the ratio of the
number of links compromised to the total number of links
formed. Links which are formed among the compromised
nodes and the links which are between the compromised
nodes and the noncompromised nodes are not taken into
account while calculating the number of compromised
links and the total links.
• Memory requirement — As the sensor nodes are
resource-constrained, so there is always the requirement
of attaining high connectivity using minimum memory.
• Vulnerable Time — It is the time interval after the
deployment during which attacker should not be able to
extract key material from the nodes, and before which all
nodes should delete the key material from their memory.
It is desirable to keep it as less as possible.
Our simulations are done for the following values of pa-
rameters. The number of tagged nodes is calculated using the
analysis in the previous section.
• Deployment region: 1000m× 1000m
• Total number of nodes (N) is taken as 10000
• Transmission radius of the node is taken as 40m
• Hop Count (H) is taken as 1
• Tkey = 2, 4, Keys per key pool M = 1000
• Tagged nodes: Ti = 1863, Tc = 1794, T = 1863
Also, simulations for the scheme [13] are done using the same
set of values.
A. Simulation Results - Connectivity
1) Local Connectivity: Figure 2a shows the plot of proba-
bility of sharing at least one key between two neighbor nodes
versus the key ring size of our scheme, scheme [13] and EG
scheme. We have simulated our scheme for Tkey = 2, 4. From
the graph it is clear that our scheme performs better than or
as well as the scheme [13]. For lower values of key ring size,
Tkey = 2 should be chosen which gives better connectivity
than that of the scheme [13], while for larger value of key
ring sizes Tkey = 4 should be chosen, which gives same
connectivity as that of the scheme [13]. We have derived
analytical expressions for the probability of sharing at least one
key between two neighbor nodes, and the results match well
with the simulated values as shown in Fig. 2b. The analytical
expressions are not reported here due to lack of space.
2) Global connectivity: For Tkey = 2, 4, Table I gives the
comparison of local connectivity with global connectivity of
the nodes. As we can see from the last row of the table, there
are small percentages (.08 and .12) of nodes which are isolated
TABLE I: Local Vs Global Connectivity
No. of Keys Local Global
(Tkeyk) Tkey Tkey
2 4 2 4
40 0.29 0.18 99.63 99.71
60 0.49 0.35 99.84 99.92
100 0.69 0.66 99.88 99.92
even at large value of key ring size. This is because they do not
receive broadcasts from any of the tagged nodes, and hence
remain isolated from the network.
However, an algorithm could be developed to tackle this
problem of a small number of nodes not receiving broadcast
from any tagged node. The simplest algorithm is as follows:
All nodes which do not receive a broadcast from any tagged
node send a packet containing their node id to the sink node,
and broadcast it up to one hop. Nodes which receive this
broadcast packet fetch the node id from the packet, and send
a message to the sink node (authenticated and encrypted with
their own key) containing the node id they received from the
broadcast packet and their group id. The sink node samples
keys from the group key pool of the neighbor nodes and
communicates it to the uncovered node.
B. Security Analysis
The basic threat model that we have considered is as
follows: If a node is captured, then all the keys contained
in it are revealed to the adversary. To evaluate the resilience
of our scheme, we consider that x nodes are compromised and
they are distributed uniformly across the deployment region.
Key ring size of any node is L = Tkeyk, where k is the
key ring size per group. Total number of keys in the key
pool is given by S = TM , where M is key pool size per
group, and T is number of tagged nodes. If one node is
captured, then the probability that a link between two non-
captured nodes is compromised is at most LS . (This is a worst
case value since links between non-captured nodes could be
secured by multiple keys). LS . For x > 1 compromised nodes,
the probability that a link is not compromised is at least(
1− LS
)x
. Then, the probability that a link is compromised is
at most 1−(1− LS )x. While comparing this metric with other
schemes, local connectivity (p) needs to be kept the same.
Figure 3a, 3b show a comparison of the resilience metric of
our scheme with that of other schemes, at local connectivity
p = 0.33 and p = 0.5. It shows that our scheme performs
better than other schemes. We see that the fraction of links
compromised due to node capture is very small compared to
that in [13]. This is attributed to the fact that our scheme has
small group size, which is equal to the total number of nodes
falling in the transmission radius of the node. So when a node
is compromised, it affects communication links of the groups
it is part of, and these are very small in size; so the fraction of
total links compromised is also very small. In [13], the group
size is bigger, so the number of affected nodes is larger, and
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so is the fraction of compromised links. However, it could
be argued that in this scheme also the number of groups can
be increased, simultaneously decreasing the number of nodes
a group; but this requires expected locations to be known
with more precision, with a corresponding increase in the
complexity of deployment.
C. Vulnerable Time
Since in our scheme keys are computed after the nodes
are deployed, so it is important to consider another threat,
which is the vulnerable time during which the compromise of
a single node can lead to compromise of whole network. We
will compare our scheme with LEAP+, which also needs to
address the issue of vulnerable time. Since we have shown
that our scheme for (H = 1) performs better than the
schemes using deployment knowledge, so we will compare
the vulnerable time for H = 1 only. Vulnerable time required
by our scheme for (H = 1) is just the time taken by all the
tagged nodes to broadcast up to one hop or time taken by
all the nodes to hear broadcast from all the neighbor tagged
nodes; the latter constitute a fraction (.18) of the total number
of nodes. In LEAP+ [10], it is the time taken by all the
nodes to hear broadcast from all the neighbor nodes. Since
the number retransmission attempts required by the node to
transmit in any MAC protocol depends on the number of
active neighbor nodes, so our scheme, which requires that
nodes should hear from only neighbor tagged nodes which
are only the fraction of total number nodes, requires less time,
than what LEAP+ does. However, there is a trade off between
performance achieved and the requirement of the vulnerable
time, since LEAP+ acheives perfect resilience and connectivity
while our scheme does not. Nevertheless, still our scheme is
able to achieve better performance than the schemes which
assumes predeployment knowledge of the nodes.
D. Addition of New Nodes
To add new nodes after the initial deployment, the base
station or sink informs tagged nodes to broadcast their tag
id’s for the new nodes. Root key is stored in the new nodes
before their deployment, using which they generate the keys.
Key generation and shared key discovery procedure is same
as described earlier. After the generation of the key ring they
delete the root key.
VI. OTHER APPLICATIONS
Apart from the main objective of key distribution, our
scheme could be used for other applications as well. Tagged
nodes could be considered as the virtual base stations (VBS)
distributed all across the deployment region, and other nodes
around them associated with them. If the main base station
wants to convey a broadcast message only to some nodes lying
in a certain region, then this could be accomplished by a single
unicast message to the tagged node (assuming tagged nodes
can identify their location) lying near that region and then that
tagged node can broadcast that message with a flag indicating
a “regional broadcast,” so that receiving nodes check the hop
count value before rebroadcasting the message. All the tagged
nodes can maintain a group key which is known only to its
group members; this will help secure delivery of the message.
This scheme can also be used for group key management. In
a distributed environment where all nodes cannot communicate
directly with base station, tagged nodes can act as the virtual
base stations. Such a scheme involving decentralization is
proposed in [14]; however, in this scheme, cluster heads
(tagged nodes) have larger transmission range than the cluster
members (normal nodes), so that they can communicate di-
rectly with sink nodes, and are less energy-constrained than
the normal nodes. Another application could be the collection
of data, where the nodes in the group sends their data to the
VBS of their respective group, and then VBS creates a single
packet and send it to BS.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a key distribution scheme, which does
not assume node predeployment knowledge and also does
not require nodes to be deployed in groups, still our scheme
achieves better performance in terms of connectivity and
security than the scheme [13] which take these assumptions.
However our scheme assumes existence of vulnerable time,
which is less than that of the LEAP+ [10], with tradeoff of
connectivity and resilience.
Our future work is to propose a way to allocate polynomial
based keys [3], to make our scheme more robust against node
capture attack. Another future work is to evaluate and compare
the performance of our scheme for non-uniform deployments.
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